The pasuk describes Moshe's encounter with the burning bush.
And Moshe said 'I will turn now to see this great sight, why is the bush not burning. And Hashem saw that he turned to see, and G-d called to him...'
The clear implication is that G-d only spoke to him when, and because he turned to see the bush. Why was that so great an act?
Moshe exhibited with this a tremendous desire to learn. He appreciated the greatness of the supernatural occurrence he was experiencing "HaMareh haGadol - This great vision", and wanted to understand it.
But it was more than that. The Medrash describes the setting under which Moshe found himself by the bush. "Moshe had gone to the desert to prevent his flock from grazing on private grass. One sheep broke away, and Moshe chased it till it collapsed from exhaustion in front of Har Sinai. Moshe lifted it to bring it back to the flock, but then saw the vision of the Bush. Hashem had said, in essence, that he who cares enough about the individual lamb would care enough about His people."
So, when Moshe turned to the bush, what happened to the sheep?
Moshe could have decided to bring the sheep back and return afterwards to investigate the "fire". Just dropping the sheep after all his efforts to get it must have been quite frustrating.
But Moshe understood that "tomorrow" doesn't always arrive. He had a once in a lifetime opportunity to see a fire such as this, and he wasn't about to let that chance slip through his fingers. This quality of recognizing the value of NOW is vital for a leader.
Lastly, Moshe was willing to re-prioritize. A minute before, he had only one goal, that of saving his livestock. Mid step, he was willing to rethink if that was really the ideal action. Deciding that his personal growth was more important (he could buy Yisro another animal) he abandoned his original goal entirely. How much is lost due to "well, its a waste of time, but I'm so close to the end..."?
R' B. M. Ezrachi, Rosh Yeshivah of Ateret, once said "a great man is one for whom every action is a great action". Someone who is constantly judging the value of his actions and reprising what his priorities should be and how to achieve them, considers every action important. He is the one who would drop everything to learn from the bush. And he is the one Hashem would choose to lead Klal Yisroel out of Egypt.
Sunday, January 18, 2009
Saved from drowning by Moshe
The gemara (Sotah 12b) describes the setting of Moshe's birth as follows.
1. Paro's advisors saw a star that represented the birth of Yisroel's savior.
2. They were not sure if he would be a Jew, so they advised to have all children (even Egyption) thrown into the sea.
3. The astrologers saw, through the stars, that Moshe had been placed in the water. They thought that to mean that the danger had passed.
4. Paro cancelled the decree to have all children thrown into the see.
The gemara then relays Moshe's comment that Klal Yisroel owed him appreciation: "It was only due to me - being put into the sea - that you were all saved. Had that not happened, the nation would have been drowned."
I don't get it. True, the decree was only cancelled because of Moshe. But it was only enacted because of Moshe as well!
In discussing this with my father shlita over Shabbos, he suggested that this is very similar to what happened with Mordechai. Mordechai instigated the fight with Haman that endangered the Jews, and is then given much credit for leading us to a advantageous resolution.
Is it possible that one must thank someone for helping him when he created the problem? Did Yosef owe his brothers appreciation for pulling him out of the pit after casting him into it? I find that hard to imagine!
When Chazal discuss the reasons for the decrees of Purim, Mordechai is not even mentioned. He was doing what he had to, and there could have been no way that would have lead to disaster, unless the tragedy was otherwise iminent and deserved. In fact, the conclusion of Purim - "Kiymu Mah SheKiblu Kvar - was that the people accepted that the actions of and enactments are made by the Rabonnim for the sake, and with the knowledge of, the Torah. They repented blaming Mordechai for causing a tragedy that he was incidental to.
We can suggest that a similar thing happened with Moshe. At some point the desperate Egyptions would have ordered the drowning of all Jewish children. Had that happened, the decree would have continued until there was no more nation, chas vsholom. Such a decree did not happen though, since the first time the thought of drowning children was floated, it was targeted Moshe, and included even the Egyption children [in theory]. Such an edict clearly could not be maintained indefinitely. As soon as the threat passed, the issue was cancelled, and was probably too sensitive a point to be raised again, even had Paro wanted to.
Perhaps a support can be found in the eventual retribution of the Egyptions. They are drowned at sea, as punishment for drowning the Yisroeli babies. Despite the fact that the decree was relatively short lived, and included Egyption babies as well [although the Egyptions might not have complied with their own children]. Perhaps though, since they intended to make such a decree against the Jewish children, and only had to abandon the idea because of the way it worked out with Moshe, they are credited with having carried out their original nefarious intentions.
1. Paro's advisors saw a star that represented the birth of Yisroel's savior.
2. They were not sure if he would be a Jew, so they advised to have all children (even Egyption) thrown into the sea.
3. The astrologers saw, through the stars, that Moshe had been placed in the water. They thought that to mean that the danger had passed.
4. Paro cancelled the decree to have all children thrown into the see.
The gemara then relays Moshe's comment that Klal Yisroel owed him appreciation: "It was only due to me - being put into the sea - that you were all saved. Had that not happened, the nation would have been drowned."
I don't get it. True, the decree was only cancelled because of Moshe. But it was only enacted because of Moshe as well!
In discussing this with my father shlita over Shabbos, he suggested that this is very similar to what happened with Mordechai. Mordechai instigated the fight with Haman that endangered the Jews, and is then given much credit for leading us to a advantageous resolution.
Is it possible that one must thank someone for helping him when he created the problem? Did Yosef owe his brothers appreciation for pulling him out of the pit after casting him into it? I find that hard to imagine!
When Chazal discuss the reasons for the decrees of Purim, Mordechai is not even mentioned. He was doing what he had to, and there could have been no way that would have lead to disaster, unless the tragedy was otherwise iminent and deserved. In fact, the conclusion of Purim - "Kiymu Mah SheKiblu Kvar - was that the people accepted that the actions of and enactments are made by the Rabonnim for the sake, and with the knowledge of, the Torah. They repented blaming Mordechai for causing a tragedy that he was incidental to.
We can suggest that a similar thing happened with Moshe. At some point the desperate Egyptions would have ordered the drowning of all Jewish children. Had that happened, the decree would have continued until there was no more nation, chas vsholom. Such a decree did not happen though, since the first time the thought of drowning children was floated, it was targeted Moshe, and included even the Egyption children [in theory]. Such an edict clearly could not be maintained indefinitely. As soon as the threat passed, the issue was cancelled, and was probably too sensitive a point to be raised again, even had Paro wanted to.
Perhaps a support can be found in the eventual retribution of the Egyptions. They are drowned at sea, as punishment for drowning the Yisroeli babies. Despite the fact that the decree was relatively short lived, and included Egyption babies as well [although the Egyptions might not have complied with their own children]. Perhaps though, since they intended to make such a decree against the Jewish children, and only had to abandon the idea because of the way it worked out with Moshe, they are credited with having carried out their original nefarious intentions.
Wednesday, December 31, 2008
Baby Wipes Part #1 - Introduction
(Spoiler: My conclusion will be that Ashekenazim should not use baby wipes, and that Sephardim may use them if they are squeezed out before Shabbos and are made entirely from synthetic materials. Nonetheless, I do not reject those that are more lenient, and it makes a useful read...)
The Shulchan Aruch (O"H 302:12) rules that one may not dry a wet cup with a towel, as he may come to squeeze the towel.
In O"H 613:9, the Rema states that one may not wipe himself on Yom Kippur with a wet towel (even if it had been wet before the onset of Yom Kippur), as he may come to squeeze the cloth.
In O"H 301:46, he adds that a wet cloth is muktzeh, and may not be moved at all.
The obvious reading is that one may not use or even move a wet cloth on Shabbos, and even a dry cloth may not be used around liquid for fear of getting it wet enough to be squeezed. Use of a soaking towelette to wipe a child be out of the question.
This, in fact, is the view of virtually all the poskim worldwide, including R' Rueven Fienstein, R' Vozner, R' Elyashiv, The Pupa Rav, and R' Yechezkal Roth, who all forbid use of baby wipes on Shabbos.
Nonetheless, I have heard of a few dissenting opinions, most notably R' David Feinstein. (The only others are R' Tvi Berkowitz (Baltimore) and R' Ephraim Greenblatt (Memphis). R' Rueven Feinstein forbids their use.) There are also some poskim that permit certain brands, or with certain caveats. The following discussion is an attempt to understand these opinions, and to explain the original statements of the Shulchan Aruch under the different circumstances that they apply.(Continued...)
Baby Wipes Part #2 - The Tshuvos
While there is not a single tshuvah, anywhere, which allows the use of baby wipes, there are a number of related leniencies in responsa from R' Tzvi Pesach Frank zt"l, R' Moshe Feinstein zt"l, and YMch"Lch R' Yechezkel Roth Shli"ta.
R’ Tzvi Pesach Frank in Shu”t Har Tzvi was asked if a person may dampen and squeeze out toilet paper before Shabbos for use on Shabbos.
He responds leniently, stating that a) The tissue is being dirtied, b) the person will not squeeze any water out while wiping himself (the tissue is quite dry), c) The water might be considered to be going to waste, d) The water is not naturally a part of the paper, and e) Water is not normally squeezed out of such tissue.
R' Moshe seems to be discussing wiping up a spill with a napkin (though this is contested, see on).
He allows it, stating that we have "trei drabonan": a) He is about to dispose of the napkin, b) The water does not get absorbed into the fibers of the napkin, only between them, c) The water is going to waste, d) It is not normal to squeeze water [from napkins], e) it is not his intention to squeeze out the water, f) the water might not get squeezed out [it is not a psik reshei].
R' Roth specifically says that using baby wipes is forbidden by the Torah, with the exception of one brand which uses plastic fibers and synthetic soap. He writes that this brand may be used to lightly wipe a baby, since it is a "shvus dshvus bmakom mitzvah": a) The water is not absorbed into the fibers themselves, b) the fibers are not from something that grows in the ground, c) it is not his intention to squeeze out the water,and d) the water might not get squeezed out [it is not a psik reshei]. It should be noted that he would probably allow such wipes to be used with force if there were no other way to clean the baby.
(continued...)
R’ Tzvi Pesach Frank in Shu”t Har Tzvi was asked if a person may dampen and squeeze out toilet paper before Shabbos for use on Shabbos.
He responds leniently, stating that a) The tissue is being dirtied, b) the person will not squeeze any water out while wiping himself (the tissue is quite dry), c) The water might be considered to be going to waste, d) The water is not naturally a part of the paper, and e) Water is not normally squeezed out of such tissue.
R' Moshe seems to be discussing wiping up a spill with a napkin (though this is contested, see on).
He allows it, stating that we have "trei drabonan": a) He is about to dispose of the napkin, b) The water does not get absorbed into the fibers of the napkin, only between them, c) The water is going to waste, d) It is not normal to squeeze water [from napkins], e) it is not his intention to squeeze out the water, f) the water might not get squeezed out [it is not a psik reshei].
R' Roth specifically says that using baby wipes is forbidden by the Torah, with the exception of one brand which uses plastic fibers and synthetic soap. He writes that this brand may be used to lightly wipe a baby, since it is a "shvus dshvus bmakom mitzvah": a) The water is not absorbed into the fibers themselves, b) the fibers are not from something that grows in the ground, c) it is not his intention to squeeze out the water,and d) the water might not get squeezed out [it is not a psik reshei]. It should be noted that he would probably allow such wipes to be used with force if there were no other way to clean the baby.
(continued...)
Tuesday, December 30, 2008
Baby Wipes Part #3 - The leniencies of Libun
One must predicate an explanation of these tshuvos with a description of the melachos that squeezing could possibly involve. Primarily these are: "Libun" [Cleaning. As the water comes out it cleans the cloth], and "Mifarek" [removing something usable from its husk. Similar to squeezing juice from a grape]. It can also cause "ripping" of the cloth (or package), separating cloths from each other, and applying oils or medicines, but these are less common and will not be dealt with in this essay.
The most obvious difference between these two melachos is that libun deals with the cloth that you are cleaning [the liquid is unimportant], and mifarek deals with the liquid that is being extracted [the cloth is inconsequential].
In practice, the two categories have completely different guidelines, and each one has their own unique leniences and stringencies.
First, some leniencies that only apply to libun:
The most obvious difference between these two melachos is that libun deals with the cloth that you are cleaning [the liquid is unimportant], and mifarek deals with the liquid that is being extracted [the cloth is inconsequential].
In practice, the two categories have completely different guidelines, and each one has their own unique leniences and stringencies.
First, some leniencies that only apply to libun:
- "Mifarek" can be with any liquid. "Cleaning" can only be with water or similar lightly-colored liquids (eg. white wine - T"z). Squeezing wine from a cloth is not libun, even Rabinically. [One might imagine that removing the wine is also a cleaning of sorts. However, if one truly wants the cloth clean, he will wait till he has water handy. Wringing out the cloth without immediately washing it just causes the cloth to stain and smell, making it even harder to clean.] There is an opinion (Ramban) that says there is cleaning even when squeezing other liquids, but it is rejected.
- Libun is not an issue where the cloth becomes dirtier as it is squeezed. (A wipe is "dirtied" during use, not "cleaned".) Based on R' Moshe.
It is important to note that this is not the same as "derech lichluch".
There is a rule that wetting a cloth on Shabbos is prohibitted because "Shriyuso ze kibuso - soaking is cleansing". That rule has two caveats:
a) "derech lichluch" is permitted. Which means that a person may dry their hands on a towel [where he has no intention to clean it - M"B], since the use is not one of cleaning - it is one that normally dirties. For example, one may be permitted to dry their hands in a towel even if that makes the towel smell better.
b) According to many authorities a clean cloth does not have the rule of "Shriyuso ze kibuso" unless a lot of water is used.
These two heterim do not apply when the cloth is squeezed, they are heterim only to wet it. - Mifarek may not even be done where the extracted liquid or the cloth is being saved temporarily. (Scraping the liquid off the top of the cloth into a sink. T"z, M"B. Elyah Rabbah allows.) Libun does not apply if the cloth will be thrown out immediately after. [Based on above Igros Moshe.]
- Rabbinical decrees as a whole can be classified into three types.
a. "Usi Lachlufei" - actions that look like [and can be confused with] the forbidden action. For example, it is forbidden to make salt water on Shabbos as it is similar to "Ibud" - salting and preserving skins.
b. Unintentional actions - where the action of issur is done, but with a mitigating intention. This includes where the action is being done incidentally (such as creating a furrow while dragging a bench, known as a "melachah she'ayno tzricha l'gufa"). It also includes where the action is being done directly, but for other reasons (milking a cow in order to save the animal from discomfort, known as "dovor sh'ayno miskaven" ).
In either case, if the person wants the melachah to be done, he transgresses the issur.
Where he does not want the melacha done, but would benefit if it was ["nicha lei", eg. he needs a furrow made, but is trying to avoid making it while dragging a bench]: If it will inevitably happen it is forbidden Biblically, if not it is forbidden Rabbinically. [eg. One may not clean his shoes for fear he might straighten the ground, even though it is not an inevitable outcome.]
Where the outcome would not benefit him in any way but will inevitably happen, there is likewise a Rabbinic prohibition. (The Aruch allows such a "dovor sh'ayno miskaven". His view is rejected in OH 320:17. Other Rishinom allow such a "melachah she'ayno tzricha l'gufa", and are similarly dismissed.)
Where he does not want to do the forbidden, is not sure it will happen, and won't benefit if it does, the action is permitted.
c. Actions that can lead to the issur. A person may not eat meat alongside his friend that is eating milk unless there is a heker.
There are no decree of types "a" or "b" on the libun of squeezing, [ie. I know of no instance where we prohibit squeezing due to it being similar to, or an unintentional act of, libun.] We do have such decrees regarding the mifarek of squeezing; One may not squeeze a synthetic cloth since it looks like mifarek, and even where the liquid goes to waste wringing a cloth is forbidden as mifarek she'ayno miskaven.
This may be a practical issue - squeezing grape juice onto the ground does not clean the cloth at all [so its entirely not related to libun], but is an action of mifarek. There are probably other cases of unintentional libun that are forbidden that I haven't come across.
Preventative decrees for libun are common - one may not touch a wet towel or even walk where he will likely fall into water for fear of squeezing out and cleaning the cloth.
There are decrees of all types related to mifarek. Nonetheless, the Rema implies that there are no decrees to prevent mifarek when he says "A wet cloth may be moved if he does not care that it is wet...", and we will explain these in due course. [See the M"B in 319, and the Shu"a in 335,1 which forbids saving the liquid of a broken barrel in a cloth.]
Baby Wipes Part #4 - The Leniencies of Mifarek
And some leniencies of mifarek:
- "Cleaning" applies even where the water is being wasted. "Mifarek" means to take the usable from the husk, not to waste the usable. When the water goes to waste there is dispute whether or not there is a rabinic prohibition.
- "Mifarek" may only apply to things which grow from the ground.
However, the actual halacha here is far from clear. Some poskim(Rashi as quoted by Tosfos, R"i, R' Tam) rule that Dush applies to all materials. Some (R' Avrohom Ben Harambom, may be Rash"i's opinion as well, I think Baal Hamaor) say this qualification applies to "Dush", but not to Mifarek. Some (Pri Migadim ibid., Eglei Tal) accept this qualification, but note that wool is considered "grown from the ground". [Mushrooms are also considered "ground grown", and silk is not resolved. I would venture that plastics and oils that are extracted from plants are also considered ground grown.] Others accept the qualification in its entirety.
Even accepting this limitation, there is a dispute which part has to be "ground gown", the cloth (Pri Migadim ibid), the liquid, or both(Eglei Tal, who says this is dependent ). - Mifarek would only apply when extracting a liquid. If the matter being extracted is halachacly a 'food' instead of a 'drink', there would be no mifarek (even rabbinically). There could still be a prohibition of cleaning. The logic is that one is viewed as cutting food in half instead of extracting food of one type from its husk. [For instance, on may squeeze a lemon onto fish, as the lemon juice is considered a 'food' unless it can settle as an independant liquid. Also, R' Aurbach reasons that the reason a mother may nurse on Shabbos is because the milk is considered 'food' for the baby, not a drink. (This deserves its own thread.)]
- The Gemara states that there is a Biblical prohibition against squeezing grapes, a Rabbinical prohibition against squeezing pomagranites, and no prohibition to squeeze "uzradin".
According to the Ran, "Mifarek" only applies to the seven "important" liquids [water, milk, wine/vinegar, olive oil, honey, blood, dew]. He argues that all other liquids are considered 'food' until after they have been extracted. Since during extraction they are not yet considered liquid, there is no Biblical prohibition in drawing them out. (See last note.)
If it is a type of liquid that is normally extracted, it would still be forbidden Rabinically. Liquids that are not commonly squeezed may[Ta"z] or may not [Shu"a] even be forbidden M'drabonan.
This view (the Ra"n), is qouted but argued on by most glosses to the Shu"a. - According to Rashi, mifarek applies whenever squeezing of such type is expected (such as wine from grapes). When such squeezing is common but not expected (such as pomegranites) the prohibition is Rabbinic. When it is uncommon, it may or may not be forbidden, as in last note. [According to Rashi, squeezing an orange nowadays would incur the death penalty, while according to the Ran it would be Rabinic prohibition.]
- The Pri Migadim (Hakdomah) explains that according to Rashi mifarek only applies where the liquid is "gathered" [mifkad pakid] within its parent. He quotes a gemara that grapes and olives are considered gathered, and points out that Rashi uses the same term regarding the milk in an animals udder. He concludes with the word "ve'haven" - understand this!
This seems difficult: How can this be explaining Rashi; Rashi said a grape is unique in that its usually squeezed, not in that its juice is gathered! Practically, as well, is the juice of a grape stored any differently than that of an orange?!
R' Tzvi Hyman suggested that according to the Pri Megadim the concept of "Mifkad Pakid" is not a literal claim that the liquid is physically gathered. It is a concept; Do we consider the juice important in its own right, as if it is a cup of juice sitting inside a shell? Or do we consider the parent as having a value that it can be extruded into a drink.
Wine and oil are important liquids that are regularly squeezed. They are therefore considered "gathered", ie. as juice inside a container, even while inside the fruit. The milk of an animal is also gathered, in that we consider it to be milk inside a cow, not just a part of the cow that can be drawn and drank.
Accordingly, Rashi, who says that pomegranates are not Biblical since they are not regularly squeezed, has logic very similar to the Ran's and based on #3 above: at the time of squeezing, he is separating food and not juice. Only grapes, which are regularly squeezed and therefore considered pakid and independent of their parent even before squeezing, are included in the biblical prohibition of mifarek. (Though nowadays oranges would have the same category.)
(If the liquid is physically gathered, it would certainly be called "pakid" as well. The gemara calls the dye of a chilazon and the blood of a virgin to be pakid, and that may be literal or figuratatively.) - Mifarek may only apply when the food is not considered attached to its parent. [Pri Migadim (introduction to O"H 310) is unsure. I do not understand the logic so cannot expound, but see the last point, as this may be a continuation of the same thought.]
- "Mifarek" may only apply to liquids that are naturally part of the food. Other liquids that have been absorbed, such as liquid into a cloth, would be forbidden rabinically.
This is the opinion of Rash"i and the M"A, but is argued on by Tosfos and others, who say that any time the liquid is commonly squeezed out, it is forbidden Biblically. - There is an opinion that Mifarek does not apply when it is done for immediate use. (Similar to Borer.) However this opinion is completely ignored by the Acharonim, and cannot be relied upon for Halachah.
- Lgufon - for the sake of the fruit
Baby Wipes Part #5 - Explaining the Tshuvos
Having covered the distinctions between the different issurim in squeezing, we can now explain the tshuvos mentioned in the second part, and how they apply to baby wipes:
R' Frank has four heterim:
1) The cloth is being dirtied during use. It therefore has no problem of Libun, as is shown in the the third point in the last post. This applies to wipes as well.
2) He is not squeezing out the paper, which is dry enough that nothing would come out. As long as nothing comes out, there is no issur of squeezing. This most definitely does not apply to wipes, by which it is virtually certain that water will be squeezed out during use.
3) The water may be considered to be going to waste. If this were true, it would remove the biblical prohibition of Mifarek, as noted in point #4 above. Unfortunately, the concept is greatly contested by all poskim. The person wants the liquid in order to clean the baby, and uses it for such. How can it be called going to waste?! Even R' Frank in his tshuva is not at all certain about this point. It certainly cannot be relied upon for wipes.
[Nonetheless, I have a possible support for the idea from O"H 320, 14 where we deal with a sponge with a handle. Not for here.]
4) The water is not naturaly part of the paper, and is not normally squeezed out. Here he is trying to gain both Rashi and Tosfos's opinion in point #12 above. In his case he is correct, and therefore the prohibition would be Rabinic. In the case of baby wipes the water is not naturally part of the cloth, so according to rashi the prohibition is Rabinic. But it is normal to squeeze wipes, so Tosfos would forbid squeezing them biblicly.
5) There are two types of Rabinic decrees concerning squeezing: Not to handle a wet or potentially wet cloth as one might come to squeeze it. And not to squeeze a material which the Torah permits lest he come to squeeze a material which the Torah forbids.
Here, R' Frank says, there is no biblical decree, as the person is not squeezing water out of the tissue. There is room only for the first of the two Rabbinic decrees - that he might come to squeeze it - and that we need not be concerned with where the water is not naturally part of the paper and is not normally squeezed out.
R' Moshe:
1) He is about to dispose of the napkin, and there is therefore no Libun. As referred to in point #2. Yet another reason why there is no Libun by wipes.
2) The water does not get absorbed into the fibers of the napkin.
In most baby wipes the water does get absorbed into the fibers, so this would not apply. A possible exception are those wipes that are made from synthetic fibers specifically for Shabbos use. However, even in those, there is usually at least 40% cotton which is absorbent.
It is important to understand what R' Moshe himself was referring to. ( It seems ludicrous to say that he felt that napkins are not absorbent.) Indeed, this tshuvah was clearly not a response to a letter, and is unclear as to what case exactly R' Moshe was referring to.
I have heard that R' Eider in his sefer quotes R' Rueven Feinstein that there was a spill in MTJ and someone asked R' Moshe if he can use a piece of looseleaf paper (that was somehow not muktzeh) to wipe it up. Looseleaf paper is treated with corn starch so as to be non-absorbent. Hence the comment by R' Moshe.
3) The water is going to waste. True in R' Moshe's case, where they are wiping a spill. As said before, does not apply to baby wipes.
4) It is not normal to squeeze out water from a napkin, nor is it his intention:
As said in point #14, most agree that when something is not normally squeezed, it is not Mifarek. Unfortunately, that does not apply to a baby wipe.
5) It is not his intention to squeeze water out.
A "Melacha she'aina tzricha l'gufa" is forbidden M'drabonan when it is a "psik raishei dnicha lei". In R' Moshe's case the person was trying to wipe up the spill, not to squeeze (aina tzricha l'gufa). In fact, he doesn't want the water to get squeezed out (lo nicha lei). It is therefore only a rabbinic issur.
Once again, this is something that would not apply to a baby wipe, where - even if he does not want to squeeze out the water - it is better for him (nicha lei) if water comes out.
6) The water might not even get squeezed out.
As before, here is trying to make it not a psik reisha. And as before, it would not apply to baby wipes where a) it is a psik reisha, b) He wants it to happen [Where a person intends to do something, it is not ain tzorech lgufa, and psik reshei makes no difference]
7) After explaining why, in his case, the only prohibition would be through a combination of Rabinic decrees, R' Moshe adds that there is a special rule in squeezing that multiple decrees do not work together to create an issur. He proves this from O"H 320, 15 where the Shu"a rules that a person may close a faucet, even if there is a cloth that will get squeezed out.
While that argument can be discussed, it would only apply in a case such as his. By baby wipes not one of his heterim for Mifarek apply.
R' Roth:
It is important to note that R' Roth invoked the shvus dshvus bmakom mitzvah, and rejected R' Moshe's logic that we do not combine decrees regarding squeezing.
Similarly, the M"B discusses using a diaper.. (biur halachah), and he also does not accept R' Moshe's chidush.
To understand why not, one must first understand R' Moshe proof. The Shu"A in O"H 320, 15 complains about the than prevalent custom of stuffing a cloth into a barrel via a long handled faucet. He concludes that where the liquid goes to waste it may be permitted, and combines three opinions for that ruling: a) The Aruch - that a davar sh'ayno miskaven is permitted on Shabbos lchatchilah. b) The Ramban - that where the liquid goes to waste, the cloth may be wrung out lchatchilah. c) The Raavad - that a sponge attached to a handle is viewed as a container and may be squeezed out lchatchilah.
While none of these opinions are accepted alone, the Shu"A combines them in order to explain the custom of using such a faucet.
One can prove from here that multiple opinions that permit an action can be combined to allow it. But R' Moshe was proving that multiple opinions that each forbid an action Rabinically can be combined to remove the prohibition entirely. It is difficult to understand how that can be proven from here.
What's more, even the Shu"A himself is clearly not happy with the ruling, and many of the glosses argue with his leniency.
In conclusion, R' Frank only permitted wet toilet paper where it was not going to get squeezed out, and even then only because toilet paper is not normally squeezed. It would seem he would forbid wipes.
R' Moshe was not dealing with a similar enough case to have an idea how he would rule.
Nonetheless, there are other arguments that can be made to defend the wipe, so don't give up...
(Continued...)
Perhaps the water is considered to be going to waste, and the prohibition would be Rabinical.
There are several ways to suggest this:
The gemara states that a sponge may not be used on Shabbos. The Ritvah there claims that the gemara must refer to an instance where the water is caught and stored during use, as it would otherwise be considered to be going to waste. Other Rishonim understand that the water is not going to waste as long as it is being used to clean the surface he is sponging. [Though see R' Rubin, that explains in many Rishonim that the sponge is actually being used to wipe a spill.]
The halacha is decided stringently in Shu"A 320:17.
It would seem to me that this is also reflected in the sugya in Yoma that we will discuss later. There, the gemara says that R' Yehoshua ben Levi would not use a wrung-out damp cloth to wipe his eyes on Yom Kippur for fear of squeezing. Had the prohibition of wiping/squeezing water onto his eyes been drabonan, he should been able to use the cloth as long as he was careful not to squeeze water - a decree to prevent squeezing would be a decree on a decree. The only explanation is that such squeezing is not considered to be going to waste, and is forbidden Biblically. Therfore a decree to prevent such squeezing is in order.
The Ritvah makes no comment there, but perhaps he had the variant reading (quoted in Rashi) that R' Yehoshua would only use a damp cloth if it had been wrung out first, even if it was less than tofeach al mnas lhatfiach. In this reading it is possible that such a cloth was close to psik reshei that it would be squeezed during use, and the rabbonim extended their decrees to include ases which are close to psik reshei.
The Rema rules stringently in accordance with the first reading.
The halochah is that this is not considered 'going to waste' (R' Aurbach, . There are no matirim that I could find).
R' Frank has four heterim:
1) The cloth is being dirtied during use. It therefore has no problem of Libun, as is shown in the the third point in the last post. This applies to wipes as well.
2) He is not squeezing out the paper, which is dry enough that nothing would come out. As long as nothing comes out, there is no issur of squeezing. This most definitely does not apply to wipes, by which it is virtually certain that water will be squeezed out during use.
3) The water may be considered to be going to waste. If this were true, it would remove the biblical prohibition of Mifarek, as noted in point #4 above. Unfortunately, the concept is greatly contested by all poskim. The person wants the liquid in order to clean the baby, and uses it for such. How can it be called going to waste?! Even R' Frank in his tshuva is not at all certain about this point. It certainly cannot be relied upon for wipes.
[Nonetheless, I have a possible support for the idea from O"H 320, 14 where we deal with a sponge with a handle. Not for here.]
4) The water is not naturaly part of the paper, and is not normally squeezed out. Here he is trying to gain both Rashi and Tosfos's opinion in point #12 above. In his case he is correct, and therefore the prohibition would be Rabinic. In the case of baby wipes the water is not naturally part of the cloth, so according to rashi the prohibition is Rabinic. But it is normal to squeeze wipes, so Tosfos would forbid squeezing them biblicly.
5) There are two types of Rabinic decrees concerning squeezing: Not to handle a wet or potentially wet cloth as one might come to squeeze it. And not to squeeze a material which the Torah permits lest he come to squeeze a material which the Torah forbids.
Here, R' Frank says, there is no biblical decree, as the person is not squeezing water out of the tissue. There is room only for the first of the two Rabbinic decrees - that he might come to squeeze it - and that we need not be concerned with where the water is not naturally part of the paper and is not normally squeezed out.
R' Moshe:
1) He is about to dispose of the napkin, and there is therefore no Libun. As referred to in point #2. Yet another reason why there is no Libun by wipes.
2) The water does not get absorbed into the fibers of the napkin.
In most baby wipes the water does get absorbed into the fibers, so this would not apply. A possible exception are those wipes that are made from synthetic fibers specifically for Shabbos use. However, even in those, there is usually at least 40% cotton which is absorbent.
It is important to understand what R' Moshe himself was referring to. ( It seems ludicrous to say that he felt that napkins are not absorbent.) Indeed, this tshuvah was clearly not a response to a letter, and is unclear as to what case exactly R' Moshe was referring to.
I have heard that R' Eider in his sefer quotes R' Rueven Feinstein that there was a spill in MTJ and someone asked R' Moshe if he can use a piece of looseleaf paper (that was somehow not muktzeh) to wipe it up. Looseleaf paper is treated with corn starch so as to be non-absorbent. Hence the comment by R' Moshe.
3) The water is going to waste. True in R' Moshe's case, where they are wiping a spill. As said before, does not apply to baby wipes.
4) It is not normal to squeeze out water from a napkin, nor is it his intention:
As said in point #14, most agree that when something is not normally squeezed, it is not Mifarek. Unfortunately, that does not apply to a baby wipe.
5) It is not his intention to squeeze water out.
A "Melacha she'aina tzricha l'gufa" is forbidden M'drabonan when it is a "psik raishei dnicha lei". In R' Moshe's case the person was trying to wipe up the spill, not to squeeze (aina tzricha l'gufa). In fact, he doesn't want the water to get squeezed out (lo nicha lei). It is therefore only a rabbinic issur.
Once again, this is something that would not apply to a baby wipe, where - even if he does not want to squeeze out the water - it is better for him (nicha lei) if water comes out.
6) The water might not even get squeezed out.
As before, here is trying to make it not a psik reisha. And as before, it would not apply to baby wipes where a) it is a psik reisha, b) He wants it to happen [Where a person intends to do something, it is not ain tzorech lgufa, and psik reshei makes no difference]
7) After explaining why, in his case, the only prohibition would be through a combination of Rabinic decrees, R' Moshe adds that there is a special rule in squeezing that multiple decrees do not work together to create an issur. He proves this from O"H 320, 15 where the Shu"a rules that a person may close a faucet, even if there is a cloth that will get squeezed out.
While that argument can be discussed, it would only apply in a case such as his. By baby wipes not one of his heterim for Mifarek apply.
R' Roth:
It is important to note that R' Roth invoked the shvus dshvus bmakom mitzvah, and rejected R' Moshe's logic that we do not combine decrees regarding squeezing.
Similarly, the M"B discusses using a diaper.. (biur halachah), and he also does not accept R' Moshe's chidush.
To understand why not, one must first understand R' Moshe proof. The Shu"A in O"H 320, 15 complains about the than prevalent custom of stuffing a cloth into a barrel via a long handled faucet. He concludes that where the liquid goes to waste it may be permitted, and combines three opinions for that ruling: a) The Aruch - that a davar sh'ayno miskaven is permitted on Shabbos lchatchilah. b) The Ramban - that where the liquid goes to waste, the cloth may be wrung out lchatchilah. c) The Raavad - that a sponge attached to a handle is viewed as a container and may be squeezed out lchatchilah.
While none of these opinions are accepted alone, the Shu"A combines them in order to explain the custom of using such a faucet.
One can prove from here that multiple opinions that permit an action can be combined to allow it. But R' Moshe was proving that multiple opinions that each forbid an action Rabinically can be combined to remove the prohibition entirely. It is difficult to understand how that can be proven from here.
What's more, even the Shu"A himself is clearly not happy with the ruling, and many of the glosses argue with his leniency.
In conclusion, R' Frank only permitted wet toilet paper where it was not going to get squeezed out, and even then only because toilet paper is not normally squeezed. It would seem he would forbid wipes.
R' Moshe was not dealing with a similar enough case to have an idea how he would rule.
Nonetheless, there are other arguments that can be made to defend the wipe, so don't give up...
(Continued...)
Perhaps the water is considered to be going to waste, and the prohibition would be Rabinical.
There are several ways to suggest this:
- The water becomes immediately dirty - never existing as a usable liquid.
A similar concept can be found in the writings of the Chazon Ish, who allowed for a cow to be milked into bleach under certain circumstances. Admittedly, the liquid here is actually being used, but perhaps it can still be considered waste. [This is not the heter of squeezing liquid into food. There, the liquid is not considered to exist until it is extracted. Since in its extracted state it is also not considered liquid, there is no schita at all. (I'm not sure now why one would be able to squeeze grapes into food.) - The water will soon be disposed of. There is no storage of the water, it is used and evaporates.
- It evaporates quickly enough not to be considered water.
Wipes generally use an alchohol solution that evaporates within a number of seconds after use. The advantage of 'waste' is that a person has not extracted something of value, which would also be true where the extracted liquid dissapears shortly, even if there is a chance to use it first.
Shmiras Shabos quotes such a view in the name of R' Aurbach in . In Vol. 3 [which was written by R' Aurbach directly], R' Aurbach himself describes that heter before rejecting it. The implication there is that if he would not have rejected this idea, he would have used it to say we have no squeezing at all, not even rabbinic.
The gemara states that a sponge may not be used on Shabbos. The Ritvah there claims that the gemara must refer to an instance where the water is caught and stored during use, as it would otherwise be considered to be going to waste. Other Rishonim understand that the water is not going to waste as long as it is being used to clean the surface he is sponging. [Though see R' Rubin, that explains in many Rishonim that the sponge is actually being used to wipe a spill.]
The halacha is decided stringently in Shu"A 320:17.
It would seem to me that this is also reflected in the sugya in Yoma that we will discuss later. There, the gemara says that R' Yehoshua ben Levi would not use a wrung-out damp cloth to wipe his eyes on Yom Kippur for fear of squeezing. Had the prohibition of wiping/squeezing water onto his eyes been drabonan, he should been able to use the cloth as long as he was careful not to squeeze water - a decree to prevent squeezing would be a decree on a decree. The only explanation is that such squeezing is not considered to be going to waste, and is forbidden Biblically. Therfore a decree to prevent such squeezing is in order.
The Ritvah makes no comment there, but perhaps he had the variant reading (quoted in Rashi) that R' Yehoshua would only use a damp cloth if it had been wrung out first, even if it was less than tofeach al mnas lhatfiach. In this reading it is possible that such a cloth was close to psik reshei that it would be squeezed during use, and the rabbonim extended their decrees to include ases which are close to psik reshei.
The Rema rules stringently in accordance with the first reading.
The halochah is that this is not considered 'going to waste' (R' Aurbach, . There are no matirim that I could find).
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